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BRETT D. CROW

Equal Consideration and Systematic
Measurement Error in Hydroelectric
Relicensing
ABSTRACT
Severalfamiliarenvironmentaleffects ofhydroelectricityproduction
are examined using stylized data derived from a Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission analysis for a project under relicensing
consideration. The data set reveals systematic measurementerrors
that can be explained by a failure to consistently assume a single
license denial storage regime (empty reservoirfullreservoir,partly
full reservoir, or current storage with turbine bypass) when
determining the effects of continued operation. One interpretation
of these errors is that beneficial effects of license renewal are
generously measured, while harmful effects are restrictively
measured despite a legal requirementfor equal consideration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hydroelectric power generation is considered by some to be a clean
electricity source that provides many benefits including abundant
recreational opportunities. Others consider this particular power source to
be one that produces considerable environmental damage. Such perceived
impacts can easily clash in the process of relicensing hydroelectric generation facilities. This relicensing process, conducted by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), provides a method for evaluating and
addressing the effects of continued operation of existing hydroelectric
power plants. Approximately 1,000 such facilities currently operate in the
United States under licenses issued by FERC. Approximately half of these
licenses are set to expire by the end of the decade.' Evaluating the operation
of a hydroelectric power plant requires considering a broad spectrum of
environmental consequences. Furthermore, the Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA) requires FERC to afford "equal consideration" to

* The author is a Special Lecturer in Mathematics at Boise State University.
1. David A. Harpman, Assessing the Short-Run Economic Cost of Environmental Constraints
on Hydropower Operations at Glen Canyon Dam, 75 LAND ECON. 390, 390 (1999); Michael R.
Moore et al.,
Testing Theories of Agency Behavior: Evidence from Hydropower Project Relicensing
Decisions of the FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission, 77 LAND EcoN. 423, 440 (2001).
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energy conservation, fish and wildlife, recreational opportunities, and other
aspects of environmental quality.2
Analyzing the effects of hydroelectric relicensing in dollar terms is
difficult because of the variety of environmental goods, services, and
amenities involved. These challenges may help explain why economists
have documented absent and inaccurately used economic information in
FERC analyses and utilized methods that increase the apparent expense of
proposed mitigation measures. 3 For example, FERC neither relies on nor
tends to use non-market valuation methods in its environmental benefit
assessments.4 Loomis et al. assert that failure to use such methods "often
results in an implicit value of zero being placed on ecosystem services."5 On
the other hand, Stephenson and Shabman observe that strong evidence of
detrimental environmental outcomes in hydroelectric relicensing has yet to
appear.6
At the same time, it can be difficult to convince policy makers and
scientists from other disciplines to seek and use the results that economists
can develop. FERC is not required to conduct social benefit-cost analyses
when relicensing hydroelectric facilities and may view such studies as
overly difficult.7 Stephenson and Shabman suggest a low demand for nonmarket valuation studies by relicensing participants. They also observe that
"most analysis is focused on quantifying ecosystem changes in terms
familiar to the decision participants."8
This article uses fundamental economic and statistical concepts to
examine a small set of stylized environmental data derived from a
hydroelectric relicensing analysis conducted by FERC. The benefits of this
approach are threefold. First, framing the problem in this way may improve
communication between economists, policy makers, and other scientists.
The reach of economic thought in hydroelectric relicensing might then be
extended beyond benefit-cost analysis and value measurements in dollar
terms. Improved interdisciplinary collaboration may result by presenting
an economic view that directly relies on measurements recorded in a

2. Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2000).
3. Moore et al., supra note 1, at 427, 429.
4. Kurt Stephenson & Leonard Shabman, The Role ofNonmarket Valuation in Hydropower
Relicensing: An Application of a Pattern Modeling Approach, 35 J. ECON. ISsuEs 497, 502 (2001);
Moore et al., supra note 1, at 427.
5. John Loomis et al., Measuring the Total Economic Value of Restoring Ecosystem Services
in an Impaired River Basin: Results from a Contingent Valuation Survey, 33 EcOLOGICAL ECON.
103, 104 (2000). The context of this study was river-based, not hydroelectric relicensing.
6. Stephenson & Shabman, supra note 4.
7. John Loomis & Marvin Feldman, An Economic Approach to Giving "Equal
Consideration"to Environmental Values in FERCHydropowerRelicensing, 5 RIvERS 96, 97 (1995);
Moore et al., supra note 1, at 427.
8. Stephenson & Shabman, supra note 4.
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fashion familiar to other scientists. Second, apparently conflicting views of
continued hydroelectric power generation can be more clearly understood,
explained, and reconciled to some degree by the following analysis. Third,
the small set of familiar data values reveals systematic measurement errors
that raise serious questions about FERC's pursuit and attainment of its
equal consideration mandate. Such errors can be explained by a failure to
apply a uniform measurement standard to all environmental measurements.
Section II presents and analyzes a set of stylized data. The analysis
finds that quantitative relicensing measurements assume that license denial
will result in the end of hydroelectric power generation. However, this does
not necessarily imply that water storage will also end, and the water storage
regime greatly affects the positive and negative effects that will result from
license denial. As a result, the examined measurements are each correct
under a specific license denial storage regime and incorrect under other
potential regimes.
The analysis then tabulates the data set observations under four
specific license denial storage regimes and finds both systematic measurement errors and statistical confounding in the data set. Section III presents
a method of coding the tabular summary so that it can be applied beyond
the stylized data set. That presentation seeks and indirectly expresses
systematic measurement errors, directly expresses the measurements of
other scientists based on their units of choice, and provides an economic
view in one market where positive and negative externalities exist. The
explanations, table, and data codes permit interdisciplinary study of the
experimental design and data treatments that inform relicensing decisions
and shed light on the type of policy statement needed to give all scientists
a single measurement baseline. In addition, the article shows how
environmentally based subsidies can rest on the use of systematically
different measurement standards for beneficial and harmful effects if policy
is not clear and rigorously enforced. Section IV concludes the article with
experimental design reflections and policy implications taken from the
analysis.
II. ANALYSIS OF STYLIZED FERC DATA
This article's analysis is based on a relicensing process conducted
by FERC in the western United States. The relicensing process incorporates
data developed by scientists from a variety of particular disciplines. These
data were submitted for public comment by FERC as either a draft or final
environmental impact analysis within the past several years. All examined
data values concentrate on the reported effects of continuing to operate the
hydroelectric facility within a reservoir-based geographic boundary
between the lowermost river mile location of a dam that provides the
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inundation opportunity and the uppermost river mile location that is
inundated by a full reservoir.
Within that boundary, the article considers a project that typically
produces 1,500 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity per year and provides
100,000 annual visitor-days of reservoir-based recreation. The article sets
aside the inherent variability of such measurements and their tendency to
change over time and therefore uses the word "typically" to convey the
statistical concept of central tendency in an elementary form such as mean
or median. In addition, the recreation figure may be regarded as an actual
count, as if reservoir users passed through a turnstile, or as an estimate
reached through proper sampling procedures. Continued operation of this
project also prevents the recovery of dry land habitats such as those that
might be used by rabbits or deer on 2,000 acres of potentially dry land, as
measured from a reservoir that holds 25 percent of its total capacity. In
other words, a long-existing reservoir at 25 percent of its capacity reveals
barren slopes above the corresponding water level, up to an elevation
marked by high water reservoir detritus and the resumption of dry land
habitats at the reservoir's filled level. The 2,000 acres figure measures this
land area on both sides of the low-storage reservoir. Finally, project
operations obstruct recoverable fish passage throughout a filled reservoir
length of 30 river miles.
These particular measurements are stylized data values derived
from the FERC document through a process of arbitrary scaling. None of
the above measurements actually appear in the FERC document. The
preceding paragraph and subsequent references to these measurements are
otherwise accurate in the sense that each stylized measurement can be
replaced with its actual corresponding value from the FERC document. The
data values have been stylized in this way to render the actual project
anonymous and to emphasize the generality of this article's analysis. Two
particular facts from the FERC document, however, are not stylized and
have not been altered. This is done because zero values cannot be scaled up
or down. First, the agency did not report any effect of continued operation
of the hydroelectric project on recreational river use within the reservoirbased geographic boundary. Assuming that river-based recreational uses
are sufficiently scarce that gaining or losing some of them would be
valuable, this article regards FERC's failure to report a river-based
recreation quantity as the sensible act of not reporting a measurement that
is actually zero. Second, some hydroelectric facilities do provide fish
passage opportunities with mechanisms such as fish ladders, whose efficacy
can be measured or debated. Neither exists at the facility examined in this
particular FERC document. That is, the project analyzed by FERC either
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contains no fish passage mechanisms or the provided mechanisms are
completely ineffective. 9
In summary, this article asks readers to consider FERC's official
reporting regarding the effects of continuing to operate a hydroelectric
project that has existed long enough to warrant relicensing consideration
within the project's reservoir-based geographic boundary. Stylistically,
operating this project provides 1,500 GWh per year of electricity and
100,000 visitor-days per year of reservoir-based recreation. Also,
recoverable dry land habitat is foregone on 2,000 acres of land revealed by
a reservoir at 25 percent of its capacity, and fish passage is prevented on a
filled reservoir length of 30 river miles. Accurately, fish passage measures
at the facility are either nonexistent or ineffective, and the failure to report
any effect on river-based recreation is regarded as indicating a zero quantity
measurement for recreational opportunities that are indeed valuable.
This article now proceeds to show that statistical confounding and
systematic measurement error plague this small set of familiar operating
effect measurements: whenever at least one of the four external effect
measurements is actually correct, then at least two of them are incorrect.
Hydroelectric Operating Effects and License Denial Storage Regimes
The argument begins with the most obvious and direct effect of
continuing to operate the project -the annual provision of 1,500 GWh of
electricity. This quantity is clearly measured from zero annual gigawatthours, a figure that is central to the nature of the measurement. Statistically,
the 1,500 GWh per year figure is a quantitative data value, so that ordinary
arithmetic operations and number line representations are sensible.
Mathematically, the measurement's number line representation is a line
segment with two specific endpoints. This is true because the measurement
is both finite and nonzero. One of these endpoints is zero, which represents
the end of the project's electricity production upon license denial, and the
other endpoint is 1,500 GWh per year, which represents the effect of
continuing to operate the project in its current fashion.
These statements contain important information about properly
measuring the effects of continuing to operate an existing hydroelectric
project in two particular ways. First, standard texts that introduce
experimental design observe that the effects of a given treatment are

9. The arbitrary scaling of cardinally measured data values is valid because the article's
argument is ordinal in nature. That is, the FERC document records all miles of fish passage
obstructed by a full reservoir and all annual visitor-days of reservoir-based recreation. It
records some recoverable dry land acreage based on a reservoir that is partially filled, and it
does not record any recoverable visitor-days of river-based recreation. The article retains this
rank ordering, even as the scaling process alters the cardinal measurements themselves.
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measured by comparison to the treatment's absence. ° In this scenario,
treatment is the act of continuing current power generation practices, and
treatment absence is the potential end of that power generation via license
denial." In other words, the number line representations of quantitative
relicensing measurements span the gap between one endpoint that
represents ending generation via license denial and a second endpoint that
represents continuing current power generation practices. Economists, in
particular, will recognize the familiar prospective form of with and without
thinking: 1,500 GWh per year of electricity will be provided if current
generation practices continue and 0 GWh per year will be provided if a
license is denied and the project's generation ends. Mathematically, it is
correct to observe that 1,500 GWh per year of electricity will be provided if
generation continues and the project's 1,500 GWh per year of electricity will
be foregone if license denial ends electricity generation. These parallel
observations reflect the fact that number line distances do not vary with the
direction of measurement.
Second, these statements specifically avoid potential confusion with
the project's original licensing and construction. Data values relevant for
that social choice question involve a treatment that consists of the onset of
hydroelectricity production and an absence of treatment that consists of a
failure to begin hydroelectricity production. This differs from the social
choice question of relicensing, where the treatment is continued electricity
production and the absence of treatment is the potential end of electricity
production through denial of a license. In particular, relicensing data values
are not retrospective and do not entertain counterfactual project absence.
Measuring existing electricity production from a zero value that represents
not having constructed a hydroelectric project, for example, produces a
measurement that is cumulative, historical, and retrospective in nature.
Such measurement is based on the false premise of never having
constructed and operated a project whose continued use is being
contemplated. Instead, relicensing data values recognize the current
existence of a hydroelectric project, including the presence of a dam and
water storage regime, and posit the potential end of hydroelectric power
generation.
Throughout, this article adheres to the economist's prospective
view of continued generation effects and the statistician's continued
generation (treatment) versus ending generation via license denial

10.

See, e.g., DAVID S. MOORE & GEORGE P. MCCABE, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF

STATISTIcs, 200-02 (5th ed. 2006).
11. Other means of not generating electricity, such as a terrorist attack or temporary
maintenance shutdown, are not relevant to relicensing analyses because the simplest
relicensing question merely concerns granting a new license or not doing so.
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(treatment absence) approach. This avoids both potential confusion with
original project construction and entertaining counterfactual project absence
and helps provide a uniform footing for all measurements. It also means
that license denial is not a separate and distinct option relative to granting
a new operating license. Instead, potential license denial is an unavoidable
and integral part of the very measurements that inform relicensing
decisions because considering potential license denial is one endpoint of the
number line intervals that represent the measurements. The fundamental
nature of quantitative relicensing measurements is a set of measurements
that record beneficial effects, which support a renewed operating license,
and harmful effects, which suggest or indicate mitigation measures and
weigh against license renewal. 2 Whether beneficial or harmful, however,
all nonzero quantitative measurements have number line representations
that reflect prospective license denial as one endpoint and the continuation
of current generation practices as the other endpoint.
Based on the measurement foundation set out above, this article
will now examine the project's external effects, beginning with the
stylistically reported provision of 100,000 annual visitor-days of reservoirbased recreation. This measurement indicates that 100,000 visitor-days per
year will be provided if current operations continue and zero visitor-days
per year will be provided if license denial ends electricity production. That
is, the entire 100,000 visitor-days per year quantity will be lost by license
denial if continued hydroelectricity production alone provides all of these
recreational opportunities. (The FERC document admits this potential loss.)
These measurement observations initially raise the question of how license
denial might result in zero reservoir visits. One possible explanation is that
license denial would mean storing so little water that all potential reservoir
users voluntarily refrain from reservoir use, perhaps due to the very small
water quantity and an unattractive basin of barren slopes or extensive
muddy flats. A second potential explanation is that a larger water quantity
would remain, so that potential users would use the reservoir if permitted.
However, usage would be denied in a fashion that produces zero reservoir
visits, such as fencing or security patrols. In either case, the 100,000 visitordays per year figure, if correct, must be measured from zero annual visits.
The ways zero visits might occur raise the question of how water storage
would proceed at a reservoir site if a new operating license is denied. The

12. This is the essential framework of a benefit-cost analysis. License denial is indicated
when harmful effects outweigh beneficial effects unless operational changes or mitigation
measures can reverse the imbalance. Granting a new license is indicated when the reverse
applies, in which case operational changes or mitigation measures may be able to increase the
positive difference between beneficial and harmful effects. Either case will entail tradeoff
analysis, which this article does not consider. Instead, this article only addresses the proper
collection of data that accurately inform subsequent tradeoff analyses.
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potential answers to that question form the foundation of this article's
arguments about systematic error and statistical confounding in FERC's
consideration of these effects.
The essential steps to initiating hydroelectric power generation are
constructing a dam, storing water, and directing water through turbines.
Relicensing measurements necessarily consider the potential end of
electricity production, but this statement alone says nothing about the
continued presence of a dam or continued water storage. The last step is
addressed because failure to generate electricity means not directing water
through turbines. But, will water storage continue and, if so, in what
fashion? Will a dam remain or not? This article will now proceed to
demonstrate that consistently addressing these water storage questions is
crucially important in order to avoid confounding the effects of continued
water storage with the effects of continued power generation. Furthermore,
the dam question is almost a technical afterthought, similar to neglecting the
period at the end of a sentence.
Specifically, consider the following four water storage options if a
new license is denied and electricity generation ends: an empty reservoir
site, a partly full reservoir held at some constant level, a reservoir whose
level fluctuates as it did before ending electricity generation, and a reservoir
that is constantly full. These four options nearly exhaust the possibilities for
water storage in the event of license denial, since the only remaining option
is a reservoir with a varying level and fluctuation characteristics different
than those observed when generating electricity. That option is set aside
and is not discussed in this article due to its breadth and unpredictability.
The first four options are investigated, however.
Initially, consider the option in which license denial ends electricity
production, but a reservoir operator continues a pattern of reservoir
fluctuations that matches the fluctuation pattern of prior electricity
production. More precisely, license denial would mean bypassing turbines
while maintaining all other storage and release attributes that currently
characterize electricity production. The text refers to this option as either
Turbine Bypass or 0cur. 13 If this is the water storage meaning of license
denial, then it is correct to observe, albeit roughly, that continuing to

13. The 0c_ designation is used in the following section. It conveys the notion that the
potential end of electricity production via license denial represents the absence of the power
production treatment by way of bypassing turbines but otherwise maintaining current storage
and release practices. It also conveys the notion of a specific operating effect baseline or
specific measurement standard -a zero or standard reference point from which operating
effects are measured.
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14
generate electricity does not provide any reservoir-based recreation.
Instead, all of the recreational visits are provided by the continued presence
of stored water. Economically, this is because reservoir users are indifferent
about whether or not electricity is generated when water is released from
a reservoir. Therefore, reservoir usage will stay more or less the same if the
only water storage consequence of license denial is the end of electricity
production by way of bypassing turbines. Statistically, this is because the
effect of continued water storage has been completely separated from the
effect of continued power generation. The statistical source of the systematic
measurement errors discussed herein is a failure to uniformly separate these
two sources of effects commonly attributed to hydroelectricity production.
Such confusion leads to confounding.
Next, consider the opposite extreme in which continued water
storage effects and continued power generation effects are not separated at
all. Instead, the effect of continued water storage is completely combined
with the effect of continued power generation, so that all 100,000 visitordays per year are viewed as originating from the sole circumstance of
continued power production. This is precisely what occurs if the end of
electricity production via license denial means the end of water storage at
the reservoir site. In that case, then, the Empty Reservoir baseline or 0 Emp
measurement standard applies. In other words, zero annual reservoir visits
will occur if license denial means the end of water storage at the reservoir
site, and 100,000 visitor-days per year will occur if current power
generation practices continue. Therefore, it is correct to observe that the sole
circumstance of continued power
production provides the entire annual
1 s
quantity of recreational visits.

14. The "roughly" qualification addresses the fact that license denial at an existing
hydroelectric facility is likely to prompt a change in the price of electricity when electricity
is procured from a different generation source. The article does not address this complication,
which is an empirical matter that requires the use of more extensive economic analysis.
Instead, the article assumes that quantities potentially affected by electricity price changes are
actually unaffected by such changes. In economic terms, reservoir-based recreation is assumed
to be perfectly inelastic with respect to electricity price changes.
15. It is important to correctly understand this logical point, which repeatedly arises in
the relicensing problem. If license denial means the end of water storage, then the entire
annual recreation quantity will be lost. The converse, however, is not necessarily true, because
the entire annual quantity can be lost in ways other than ending water storage. Thus, the
potential loss is a necessary but not a sufficient condition regarding the end of water storage.
This potential loss does not imply use of the Empty Reservoir baseline or the 0m
measurement standard. While bearing this logical point in mind, however, the text otherwise
presumes that license denial reservoir usage, if sought, would be permitted. The contrary
presumption is not mentioned in the FERC document and, if license denial entails reservoir
usage denial, one would expect the document to observe that continued project operation
avoids any costs associated with preventing reservoir usage under license denial.
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Between these two extremes rests the Partly Full reservoir baseline
or OL, measurement standard, which partially separates continued water
storage and continued power generation effects. This represents a license
denial setting in which a reservoir operator would hold a reservoir at some
constant level that is neither full nor empty by storing and releasing water
as needed. This leads to the discussion proceeding with the stylized 25
percent capacity figure derived from the FERC document. It is therefore
reasonable to suppose that ending power generation means that some
reservoir visits, perhaps 30,000 visitor-days per year, will occur. In that case,
then, the 100,000 visitor-days per year figure is divided into 30,000 visitordays per year that are provided by continued water storage and 70,000
visitor-days per year that are provided by continued power generation.
Finally, the fourth water storage option under license denial is the
maintenance of a full reservoir, which is referred to as the Full Reservoir
baseline or 0,, measurement standard. This license denial storage alternative actually reverses the common understanding that hydroelectricity
production provides reservoir-based recreation, because power-producing
reservoirs are often not maintained at their full storage capacity. In
particular, reservoirs in the western United States typically reach their
highest levels after the spring snowmelt and are then gradually drawn
down to lower levels during the summer and fall months. This means that
the 100,000 visitor-days per year figure is based on a seasonally decreasing
reservoir level that would not exist under a full reservoir license denial
regime. Instead, license denial would mean ending the seasonal drawdown
and leaving the reservoir constantly full so it is reasonable to expect greater
reservoir use, perhaps 140,000 visitor-days per year. Thus, the effect of
continued power generation on reservoir-based recreation is actually
harmful because continued power production provides less of something
that society regards as beneficial. Alternatively, the quantity of reservoirbased recreation provided by continued power generation would actually
be minus 40,000 visitor-days per year. 6

16. The discussion of seasonal drawdowns may prompt the observation that continued
power production is annually viewed as a process of partial drainage under the Full Reservoir
baseline, hence the harmful nature of continued power generation under this baseline, and
is annually viewed as a process of either partial or complete filling under the Partly Full and
Empty Reservoir baselines, respectively, hence the provision of positive recreation quantities.
Yet one can correctly observe that both filling and partial drainage occur each year. Fiscal
years may provide a useful resolution analogy. The project's "fiscal year" under the Partly
Full baseline would likely begin in October, in accordance with the Western notion of a water
year. Thus, reservoir-based recreation is annually provided by reservoir filling, yet seasonally
harmed by a summer drawdown. The project's "fiscal year" under the Full Reservoir baseline
would likely begin in June or July, at the end of the spring snowmelt. Thus, reservoir-based
recreation is harmed annually because of the seasonal drawdown. This emphasizes the need
to precisely specify a baseline for relicensing measurements.
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In summary, the stylized 100,000 visitor-days per year figure can
be viewed in the following ways. The figure is correct if license denial
means the end of water storage because all of these visits would be lost. The
figure is overstated if license denial means holding the reservoir at 25
percent of its capacity and if usage at that capacity is both permitted and
desired. Some usage would then occur at the 25 percent capacity level
because of continued water storage and only the remaining portion of the
100,000 visitor-days per year figure can correctly be attributed to continued
power production. The figure is also overstated if license denial means
bypassing turbines and permitting usage because reservoir usage would
then continue more or less unchanged. Setting aside any indirect price
effect, the reservoir-based recreation quantity provided by continued power
production is actually zero. Finally, the figure is again overstated if license
denial means maintaining a full reservoir. Continued power production
then harms reservoir-based recreation by its failure to maintain a full
reservoir, which is another way of saying that the provided quantity is not
positive.
These observations show that the quantity of reservoir-based
recreation provided by continued power generation critically relies on the
water storage regime expected by the denial of a new operating license. In
particular, the Empty, Partly Full, and Turbine Bypass baselines describe
potential degrees of separation for effects due to continued water storage
and continued power generation, from no separation to complete
separation, respectively, and the Full Reservoir baseline actually reverses
the common understanding that hydroelectricity production provides a
positive quantity of reservoir-based recreation. 7
At the same time, the issue of whether or not a dam remains upon
license denial is of relatively little measurement importance. One
explanation for this statement is that virtually all reservoir-based recreation
occurs on a reservoir's surface or along its shore. Very little reservoir-based
recreation occurs from a dam that provides the inundation opportunity.
Indeed, safety concerns may legitimately prompt the prohibition of
reservoir use and access from a dam itself. A second explanation is that
nearly all of the potential baselines under discussion, with the sole

17. It may be valuable to again emphasize the distinction between an initial licensing
problem, when no hydroelectric project exists, and the relicensing problem, when a
hydroelectric project has existed for many years. Constructing a hydroelectric project where
none exists often provides reservoir-based recreational opportunities. But nothing about the
past onset of hydroelectricity production can be either replicated or influenced by an
affirmative or negative relicensing decision that occurs many years later. Continued power
production at an existing project only provides beneficial effects or imposes harmful effects
to the extent that the effects would change upon ending electricity production under license
denial.
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exception of the Empty Reservoir baseline, clearly indicate that a dam
remains and that it probably remains in its originally constructed form, or
very nearly so. Only the Empty Reservoir baseline suggests partial or
complete dam removal, and it is important to note that "implies partial or
complete dam removal" is inaccurate.
Logically, this is true because a dam is necessary but not sufficient
for water storage and because water storage is necessary but not sufficient
for hydroelectric power generation. The first observation is true because
dams can exist without water being stored. The western United States, for
example, contains many reservoirs that at least intermittently run dry, so
that not all dams have water stored behind them at all times. The second
observation is true for similar reasons: water can be stored without
electricity being generated and not all reservoirs are used to generate
hydroelectricity. Thus, the idea that license denial can result in an empty
reservoir site can be entertained for measurement purposes without
implying or specifying partial or complete dam removal. This can be done
by simply considering some other way of ending water storage. Possibilities
such as diverting water around a standing structure with tunnels, ditches,
or pipelines immediately arise. These options may seem frivolous or may
be quite expensive, but they cannot refute a logical argument that is based
only on the possibility of not storing water behind an intact dam.
When considering the effects of relicensing an existing hydroelectric
facility, continued dam presence is unimportant relative to continued water
storage. Dams merely provide an inundation opportunity, and the effects
of hydroelectricity generation arise almost entirely by taking advantage of
that opportunity. That is, consideration of the structure must be separated
from consideration of its actual use. The western United States, in
particular, has ample historical precedent for and knowledge about the
distinction between structures and water use; the region is known for
abandoning the former and engaging in long-standing disputes about the
latter. In particular, John Wesley Powell recognized water's value to the
region in the nineteenth century and the same doubtlessly remains true in
the twenty-first century. Failing to make this distinction unfortunately
confuses the vault's door with its contents. 8

18. It is true, however, that the question of continued dam presence cannot be ignored
completely. For example, a benefit-cost analysis based on zero storage if a new license is
denied would need to consider either the expense of dam removal or the expense of bypassing
an intact structure. Partial or complete removal of the structure is indicated for analytical
purposes if it is the less expensive of these alternatives.
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River-Based Recreation Effects
The analysis for the remaining stylized data values from the FERC
document proceeds in a similar fashion, beginning with the cited absence
of any continued power generation effect on river-based recreation within
the reservoir-based geographic boundary. Again, this article regards that
absence as the sensible act of not including a zero measurement for
recreational visitor-days that are actually valuable. Initially, however, it is
important to observe that the river-based recreation under discussion is not
equivalent to the river-based recreation given up to initial project
construction. River-based recreation prior to project construction occurred
at a potential reservoir site so that existing dry land habitats continued to
the edge of a flowing river. River-based recreation within the confines of a
long-existing reservoir site, when it occurs, takes place in a river environment degraded by the long existence of the reservoir. River-based recreation
can easily occur within the geographic confines of an existing reservoir site
by simply having a reservoir level low enough to expose some flowing river
water above the reservoir's existing elevation and below its filled elevation.
Indeed, such recreation is expected. Fishing in moving river water at a
geographic location that is sometimes inundated by a filled reservoir is one
potential example. Yet dry land habitats will no longer exist along such an
exposed river section due to many years of repeated inundation. Instead,
river users will observe barren slopes up to a detritus line that marks a
reservoir's filled elevation.
Economically, this distinction occurs because the river-based
recreation available at an existing reservoir site is an economic substitute for
similar recreation activities that were available prior to inundation.
Clarifying this point when misunderstood or misstated corrects arguments
that valuable attributes of particular locations have been forever lost, either
to inundation or some other type of damage. Useful examples exist in
Yellowstone National Park's recovery from fire and the absence of wolves
and in ecosystem recovery around Mt. Saint Helens. In each case damage
or utter destruction was imposed on the system and recovery has now
commenced. Recovery brings forth an economic substitute that becomes a
better substitute as recovery proceeds; foregone recovery opportunities
refer to these substitutes. Concern about giving up recovery opportunities
is not equivalent to seeking what might have been.
The FERC document can therefore be regarded as indicating a zero
value for recoverable river-based recreation; in other words, license denial
would have no effect on the degraded river-based recreational visits that
substitute for the river-based recreation available in the absence of project
construction. This is precisely what should occur under the Turbine Bypass
measurement standard. As was the case with reservoirbaseline or 0ct
aside indirect price effects means that river-based
recreation,
setting
based
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recreation will continue as it currently exists if the license denial water
storage regime merely entails bypassing turbines so that the effect of
continued power generation is zero. The effect is illusory and need not be
measured. Under either the Empty Reservoir or Partly Full baselines,
however, license denial can be expected to expose more flowing river water
during more of the year when compared with the alternative of continued
power generation. Thus, recreational activities on flowing river water can
be expected to increase upon license denial so that continued power
generation prevents some positive quantity of recoverable river-based
recreation. FERC's record of a zero value therefore understates a harmful
effect of continued power generation. 9 Finally, a Full Reservoir storage
regime under license denial would mean that no river-based recreation can
occur within the reservoir-based geographic boundary, while some quantity
almost certainly occurs under the existing power-generation storage regime.
In that case, continued power generation almost certainly provides a
positive quantity of this recreation type. Once again, the Full Reservoir
baseline reverses the common understanding of a power generation effect.
Recoverable Dry Land Habitat
The analysis for foregone yet recoverable acres of dry land habitat
is largely, though not totally, the same. The FERC document stylistically
records 2,000 acres of such habitat, which is again an economic substitute
for the habitat that would have existed without project construction and
operation, and the document connects this acreage to a reservoir at 25
percent of its capacity. In other words, periodic inundation has produced
barren slopes along both sides of the reservoir from the elevation of the 25
percent capacity reservoir to the reservoir's elevation when filled. These
barren slopes have a surface area of 2,000 acres. Ending periodic inundation
of these slopes by holding the reservoir at 25 percent of its capacity under
license denial would permit gradual habitat recovery on these acres. FERC

19. Given the agency's experience with relicensing, the text assumes that the omission
of any river-based recreation effect within the reservoir-based geographic boundary was not
merely an oversight. Beyond that, there are other valid, yet untenable, explanations for
FERC's failure to report any river-based recreation effect within the reservoir-based
geographic boundary. FERC may not have distinguished river-based and reservoir-based
recreation, but then the reservoir-based recreational quantity is probably overstated because
it includes some river usage. Alternatively, it may be that no river use occurs during times of
low reservoir storage or that proper sampling procedures failed to reveal any river use. Both
explanations appear unlikely. Finally, it may be that some river-based recreation occurs but
that FERC, in contrast to this article, regarded this recoverable river use as valueless, in which
case it would have been correct to leave this recreation type out of the FERC document. In
addition, the discussion of this recreation type also presumes that usage is permitted rather
than denied.
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has therefore reported an acreage figure that is correct under the Partly Full
baseline or 0Low measurement standard.
The figure is understated, however, under the Empty Reservoir
baseline because habitat recovery would proceed on additional acres that
are inundated below the level of the 25 percent capacity reservoir. These
additional recoverable habitat acres have not been measured or considered.
Finally, under either the Turbine Bypass or Full Reservoir baselines, any
effect on recoverable acres of dry land habitat is illusory and need not be
measured. In the former case, habitat recovery would not occur under
license denial because reservoir fluctuations would continue, and in the
latter case habitat recovery would not occur under license denial because
the entire acreage of the full reservoir's floor would be continually
inundated. The 2,000 acres figure thus overstates the acreage of recoverable
habitat under these baselines because the recoverable acreage is actually
zero.
Fish Passage
The final stylistic measurement from the FERC document concerns
the admitted prevention of fish passage on a filled reservoir site's 30 linear
river miles, where no passage measures exist or existing passage measures
are completely ineffective. 20 If license denial means the end of water storage,
namely, the use of the Empty Reservoir baseline or 0 Empty measurement
standard, then this measurement is correct. 2 Necessary and sufficient
conditions again arise on this point. The 30-miles obstruction figure is
correct if and only if it is measured from zero obstructed river miles because
reaching the "30" position on a number line from any position other than
zero must produce a length measurement that differs from 30. Zero
obstructed river miles would exist had the river never been obstructed, but
this is false since no relicensing outcome can undo the historical fact of
project construction. Thus, the reported measurement implicitly supposes
zero obstructed river miles if a license is denied, which can only occur by
entirely freeing the river from existing obstructions or by perfectly
overcoming any obstruction that remains. (The FERC document does not
suggest providing passage upon license denial if a passage obstacle

20. On this point, the FERC document does distinguish the passage obstacle length
historically imposed by a dam and the passage obstacle length that currently exists because
of project operations.
21. The text does not examine zero storage license denial options such as a reservoirlength pipeline that, although possible, appear fanciful. Also, if this is the means of achieving
an empty reservoir site, then the obstructed passage length remains constant whether or not
electricity is produced, so the influence of continued power production on the obstruction
length is zero.
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remains.) The measurement is correct if it proceeds from the Empty
Reservoir baseline but does not imply use of that baseline because license
denial can provide passage, although perhaps not perfectly so, while
storage continues. Fish ladders or physical capture and transport are
examples. While bearing this logical point in mind, however, the text
otherwise presumes that license denial fish passage either would not exist
or would not be effective.
With that caveat, the reported 30-miles figure is overstated under
all of the remaining baselines. If license denial means bypassing turbines
while retaining other current storage and release characteristics, then any
passage effects from continued dam presence and continued water storage
are entirely separated from passage effects due to continued power
generation. The passage problem upon license denial would therefore
remain as it currently exists while power is generated. Therefore, the power
generation effect is actually zero. If license denial means holding the
reservoir at 25 percent of its capacity, then some obstructed passage length
will remain after power generation ends and continued power generation
only obstructs the remaining portion of the 30 miles. Finally, the measurement cannot be positive if license denial means maintaining a full reservoir.
As was the case with the recreation figures, typical power production
operations do not leave the reservoir constantly filled, while license denial
under the Full Reservoir baseline would entail a constantly filled reservoir.
Thus, under that storage regime, fish seeking passage are likely to find a
longer reservoir obstacle under license denial than under current power
generation practices so that continued power generation actually reduces
the obstacle length.'
These observations about the external effects of continuing to
operate this hydroelectric project are summarized below in Table 1. It
should be noted that the observations are subject to the various

22. These observations raise the issue of fish passage timing, which the FERC document
does not relate to the passage obstacle length. For example, certain migratory fish species may
attempt passage while a reservoir is at a seasonally low level at a facility with nonexistent or
ineffective passage measures. In that case, the obstacle length of a dam and partly full
reservoir, relative to an empty reservoir site, will be less than the filled reservoir length
because the dam and still reservoir water form the obstacle for any fish species accustomed
to passage in moving river water. Also, dams are again relatively unimportant regarding this
measurement. A dam whose base occupies 500 feet of river channel length hinders passage
on less than one percent of a passage route relative to a ten-mile long reservoir and less than
0.1 percent of a passage route that totals 100 miles. And a dam is necessary rather than
sufficient for water storage. Nearly all passage obstacles vanish if water storage is reduced to
zero and remain otherwise (excluding license denial alternatives such as a pipeline equal in
length to a full reservoir), and a standing structure can be bypassed to address any remaining
passage obstacles. Therefore, storage can be set to zero while water and fish pass from one
side of an intact structure to the other.
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qualifications that have arisen in the text. In particular, the table presumes
that recreational use of both the reservoir and exposed river sections within
the reservoir-based geographic boundary will be permitted after license
denial and that both of these recreational quantities are perfectly inelastic
with respect to the price of electricity. The table also presumes that no
effective fish passage measures will be implemented following license
denial. Finally, aside from the fact that the FERC document connects the
2,000 acres of foregone yet recoverable dry land habitat to the 25 percent
reservoir capacity figure, the table indicates the status of each reported
measurement under each particular license denial storage regime without
implying that FERC's body of scientific work actually uses any one of these
particular storage regime baselines. 3 The table immediately conveys the
measurement difficulties present in this small set of familiar measurements
because no single license denial storage regime contains correct measurements for all four examined external effects.
Statistically, FERC's data record contains multiple systematic
measurement errors under all examined baselines. At this article's level of
analysis, FERC's data record relating to the effects of continuing to operate
this project is incorrect no matter which license denial storage regime is
intended.24
Understanding the Systematic Measurement Errors
These systematic measurement errors can be explained as the result
of confounding the sources of the measured effects. Thus far this article has
entertained three alternative effect sources other than the act of continuing
to generate electricity. First, if at least partially effective fish passage
measures existed at this project, then it is possible that the effects of
continuing these measures could be confounded with the effects of
continued power generation. The lack of any effective fish passage
measures at this project eliminates the possibility of confounding these
effect sources.

23. Use of a particular baseline will be implied when a measurement is correct under a
particular baseline and when nothing other than use of this baseline can produce a correct
measurement. Thus, an implication possibility may exist but no implication outcomes were
observed in this small data set.
24. Recall that the analysis excludes a license denial storage regime with a varying
reservoir level and a fluctuation pattern that differs from current power generation practices.
Second, a continuum of Partly Full baselines exists, and only the 25 percent capacity figure
is examined. The analysis would be substantially more complex if it posited specific
functional relationships between the license denial storage regime and the quantities of
provided or foregone goods and services. Third, the analysis abstracts from indirect price
effects, which might otherwise mimic certain errors detailed in the table.
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Second, the effects of continued dam presence might be confounded
with the effects of continued power generation. This article argues,
however, that this potential confounding source is of little importance
regarding the examined measurements. Dams are thoughtfully located and
efficiently constructed, so that a small physical size provides a large
inundation opportunity. This means, for example, that little or no reservoirbased recreation occurs from a dam itself, relative to usage that occurs on
a reservoir's surface or along its shore, even if such recreation is permitted.
Consequently, a recorded recreational use figure arises almost entirely
because of the continued presence of stored water rather than the continued
presence of a dam. Similar observations can be made about the other
examined effects. Considering that these effects are small, this article can
safely abstract from effects produced by a dam's continued presence
without incurring an important confounding penalty.
This leaves the third and most important confounding source
- the
continued presence of stored reservoir water and the manner in which that
storage proceeds -which is detailed by the companion row at the bottom
of Table 1. The Turbine Bypass baseline completely separates the effects of
continued water storage from the effects of continued power generation,
which is why all of the examined power effect measurements should be
zero in that column of the table. If license denial means bypassing turbines
while retaining other water storage and release characteristics, then
continued power generation is rather benign. Provided or foregone goods
and services will continue to exist at more or less constant quantities upon
license denial. Therefore, society will gain or lose nearly nothing in the way
of external effects by continuing to generate power under a new operating
license.' At the opposite extreme, the Empty Reservoir baseline does not
separate the effects of continued water storage and continued power
generation at all. Instead, this baseline fully commingles these effect sources
under the single banner of continued power generation. Thus, continued
power generation alone provides all of a reservoir's recreational
opportunities because license denial would entail the complete loss of those
opportunities, and similar observations apply to the other examined effects.
The Partly Full baseline falls in between these extremes.
There are also two distinct economic views of the information
presented in Table 1. First, each column can be viewed as providing
information about production possibilities. In particular, consider the
Empty Reservoir baseline and the presented recreational effects. This

25. Recall that the analysis does not extend to the tradeoff analyses entailed by potential
operating changes or mitigation measures. As used here, continued power generation means
continuing the activities that characterize existing generation practices, which the FERC
document presents as the source of its measured operating effects.
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information provides production possibilities information in the same way
as the familiar guns and butter production possibilities curve of
introductory economics courses. That is, a certain stretch of river miles can
and almost certainly does provide both reservoir-based and recoverable
river-based recreational opportunities, even when those river miles are
currently inundated during much of the year. The FERC document has fully
recorded the quantity of reservoir-based recreation that would be foregone
under an Empty Reservoir license denial regime by recording those visits
as being provided by continued power generation. Yet, if some quantity of
reservoir-based recreation is being provided by continued power
generation, mainly through the act of continuing to store water, then some
quantity of recoverable river-based recreation is almost certainly being
foregone because of the continuing inundation. Because the FERC
document records no such quantity, it distorts the terms of any subsequent
tradeoff analysis. In a Robinson Crusoe economy, an analogous situation
would be an islander who supposes that burning wood in a fire does not
entail giving up the use of that wood for shelter. Reading the table's
columns from left to right reveals an interesting economic phenomenon.
The production possibilities curve is farthest from the origin under the
Empty Reservoir baseline, contracts toward the origin under the Partly Full
baseline, and rests at the origin under the Turbine Bypass baseline. It then
inverts into the third quadrant under the Full Reservoir baseline, where the
quantity of
provided quantity of reservoir-based recreation and foregone
26
recoverable river-based recreation are both nonpositive.
The second economic view involves the distinction between shortrun and long-run costs - language this article has generally avoided because
of its likely association with the measurement unit of dollars. Short-run
thinking means that at least one foregone opportunity continues regardless
of the generated electricity quantity. That is, continued power generation
entails some level of fixed economic cost, where economic cost refers to
giving up the next-best alternative use opportunity of a productive
resource. All economic costs are variable under long-run thinking, however,
which indicates that all resources currently devoted to continued power
generation can instead be directed to their next-best alternative use under
license denial. To the extent that continued power generation relies on
continued water storage and continued water storage in turn imposes
foregone opportunities, this suggests the end of all storage-imposed

26. The article generally omits the use of prices in order to focus on the quantity
measurements familiar to those who are not economists. This removes a dimension from the
relicensing problem, which permits the concurrent examination of multiple production
possibility settings under different license denial storage regimes. In turn, this permits the
systematic measurement error and confounding conclusions.
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foregone opportunities under license denial. In other words, long-run
economic thinking suggests the use of the Empty Reservoir baseline when
relicensing hydroelectric facilities.
This observation is important for both economic and legal reasons.
Economically, it suggests the source of the apparent debate between Loomis
et al., who asserted that the failure to use non-market valuation methods
"often results in an implicit value of zero being placed on ecosystem
services," 27 and Stephenson and Shabman, who noted the lack of strong
evidence for detrimental outcomes in hydroelectric relicensing. 28 The
Turbine Bypass column of Table 1 shows that continued power generation
imposes rather little in the way of foregone opportunities. This is a
legitimate short-run view of hydroelectricity's economic cost because it
completely separates continued water storage effects from continued power
generation effects, which means that the opportunity costs of continued
water storage continue regardless of the generated electricity quantity.
However, the Empty Reservoir baseline completely combines continued
water storage effects with continued power generation effects so that all
storage-imposed foregone opportunities are expected to end upon license
denial. In that case, long-run thinking indicates that the FERC document, by
omitting mention of foregone yet recoverable river-based recreation,
sensibly omits a valuable recreation quantity by regarding it as zero.29 Such
an approach mirrors the analytical approach of this article. The alternative
explanation is that the FERC document regards this recreational type as
valueless, which is the position expressed by Loomis et al.30 Legally,
Congress may have intended that rivers be restored to a freely flowing state
when license denial ends electricity production, in the same basic way that
Wyoming prairies are restored after coal is mined, by viewing
hydroelectricity production and its water storage as temporary river uses.
This section, then, has used economic and statistical thinking to
examine a largely stylized set of measurements recorded in a FERC
environmental impact analysis. The measurements were recorded and
examined in quantity units familiar to scientists who are not economists,
and the analysis set aside the price notion of relative value that economic
analyses typically employ. As a result, the data set emerges as one plagued

27. Loomis et al., supra note 5, at 104 (although there the assertion was not made in the
context of hydroelectricity). Also recall supranote 19, which observes that regarding foregone
yet recoverable river uses as valueless would justify their absence in the FERC document.
28. Stephenson & Shabman, supra note 4, at 502.
29. The recoverable quantity of river-based recreation exceeds zero under long-run
thinking. If FERC regards this quantity as zero, then the agency's data record is incorrect.
Proceeding from that incorrect data record, however, the omission itself is sensible.
30. See supra note 19, which dismissed other explanations for the FERC omission as either
untenable or indicative of an overstated figure for reservoir-based recreation.
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by systematic measurement error because no single license denial water
storage regime contains correct values for all recorded measurements. The
approach suggests an interdisciplinary, yet economically based, procedure
for assessing whether the experimental design and data use in relicensing
rest on a single baseline common to all scientific disciplines, which is
developed in the next section. The process explicitly and directly relies on
measurements recorded by other scientists in their units of choice and
refrains from discounting and dollar-denominated measurements. 3' At the
same time, it permits the expression of an economic view for a basic
relicensing problem.
III. AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN ASSESSMENT METHOD
Economically, firms are presumed to maximize profits, which are
defined as the difference between revenues and costs. Since firms
participate in hydroelectric relicensing, perhaps reluctantly, relicensing is
an opportunity to pursue profit maximization. To the extent that beneficial
effects of continued power generation contribute to revenues, that
mitigation of harmful effects contributes to costs, or that provision of
beneficial effects can be used to offset mitigation of harmful effects, profit
maximization provides an incentive to seek generously measured beneficial
effects and restrictively measured harmful effects. That is, firms have an
incentive to use, say, the Empty Reservoir baseline or 0 Empty measurement
standard when recording beneficial effects of continued power generation.
Such measurements combine reservoir effects with power generation effects
under the single heading of power generation effects. At the same time,
firms have an incentive to use, say, the Turbine Bypass baseline or 0 cnt
measurement standard when recording harmful effects of continued power
generation. Such measurements separate or remove reservoir effects from
power generation effects and thereby produce smaller power generation
effect measurements; these can economically be termed net measurements
because continued water storage effects are netted against continued power
generation effects. Large beneficial effect measurements improve the chance
of license renewal, and small harmful effect measurements avoid potential
mitigation costs or mandated operational changes.
This section presents a procedure for assessing how successful
power companies are in achieving that goal. The economic rationale is clear:
31. Recovery of many river attributes, if possible, is likely to take many years, and
economists would typically address this with a discount rate that gives less weight to data
values at more distant times. The discussion is static in nature and abstracts from discount
rates, in part because other scientists may have concerns about discount rate use. See, e.g.,
Russell Lande et al., OptimalHarvesting,Economic Discountingand Extinction Risk in Fluctuating
Populations,372 NATURE 88, 89 (1994).
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success yields a subsidy, and greater success by one firm relative to another
creates a comparative advantage to the extent that the electricity market is
or becomes competitive. The more general scientific rationale behind this
assessment is to avoid confounding effects and systematic measurement
error by implementing careful experimental design and data treatments.
Power company success in using different measurement standards for
beneficial and harmful effects indicates a biased or otherwise flawed
experimental design, the lack of appropriate data treatments, or both. The
legal rationale is the principle of equal consideration required in the FERC
relicensing process: subsidies derived from a biased or flawed experiment
that favors power companies by using different measurement standards for
beneficial and harmful effects may violate the law.
Table 2 illustrates the procedure's presentation structure. The table
essentially parallels Table 1, with columns that identify the four operating
effect baselines or measurement standards discussed in the text, namely the
different license denial water storage regimes; rows that identify various
goods, services, or amenities; and coded data values. The table converts the
Table 1 observations to a coded numerical form but is otherwise merely
suggestive. For example, not all rows are filled. In particular, the table
suggests that the Table 1 analysis can be generalized by considering the
complete list of operating effects from an existing hydroelectric project
rather than the small data set examined for Table 1. The text then discusses
certain coding possibilities without presenting an exhaustive analysis. In
addition, the text neither presumes nor examines statistical properties
because the coding serves an identification purpose.
In greater detail, the leftmost column identifies power generation
and certain particular goods, services, or amenities that may be provided
or harmed by continued power generation, along with measurement units
for particular quantities. The rightmost column provides space for
identifying subsidiary relationships or other information needed for
particular measurements.32 The effect rows are subdivided into three
categories: power production itself, external beneficial effects, and external
harmful effects. These categories apply to each of the license denial storage
regimes included in the middle column; the effect grouping reflects the fact
that beneficial and harmful effects themselves cannot be characterized
without some water storage determination.33 As structured, the table

32. Comparesupranote 22, which observed that fish may not encounter a passage obstacle
whose length equals that of a dam and filled reservoir site when their passage timing
coincides with an unfilled reservoir.
33. Using the Full Reservoir baseline or 0 FuH measurement standard, for example,
indicates a full reservoir license denial storage regime. If annual reservoir inflows can keep
a reservoir filled and continued power production does not, then reservoir-based recreation
is harmed by continued power generation and river-based recreational opportunities are
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applies to one year and provides an economic view in one market where
positive and negative externalities exist. Greater time detail might be
achieved by subdividing within and below the different measurement
standards with additional columns.'
Data codes are based on the arguments presented in the text. In
ascending order, the codes begin with -1. This code indicates that a
measurement should not be positive under a particular measurement
standard. The next code is 0, which indicates that an effect measurement
should be zero (direct) or nearly zero (indirect) under a particular
measurement standard.' A coded value of 1 indicates that an effect under
a particular measurement standard should be smaller than the recorded
measurement, so a recorded measurement is overstated under that
standard. A coded value of 2 indicates a correctly recorded measurement
under a particular measurement standard. Finally, a coded value of 3
indicates that an effect under a particular measurement standard should be
larger than the recorded measurement, so a recorded measurement is
understated when using that particular measurement standard. Aside from
missing or omitted information, these five codes exhaust the systematic
measurement error possibilities: a recorded measurement considered under
a particular measurement standard is either correct (2), overstated (1),
understated (3), not necessary because the direct effect is zero (0), or has
been measured in the wrong direction (-1).
Thus, the codes abstract from random measurement errors to focus
instead on systematic measurement errors. The table and codes provide
data to examine the structure of a relicensing problem, although two
cautionary notes should be considered. First, the codes are merely ordinal
in nature. In particular, the -1 code relative to the 2 code may suggest that
the magnitude of a directional error will be smaller than a correct recorded
measurement, which may be incorrect. Normalizing the stored water
quantity to the [0,1] interval on the x-axis, with a related quantity

provided by continued power generation. The beneficial and harmful effect characterizations
can be reversed by the choice of measurement standard, so the standard must be specified in
order to know what is beneficial and what is harmful.
34. For example, the table's single-year structure might be subdivided to focus on
seasonal effects or years might be added to address effects over longer periods. The latter
approach would raise the topic of discounting. As presented, the table provides a snapshot
representing a static analysis.
35. Recall that economic theory did not permit a precise statement about reservoir-based
recreation provided by continued power generation under the 0c_. measurement standard
due to the possibility of indirect price effects, and that the discussion then abstracted from this
difficulty for all examined standards. The coding could reflect the lack of certainty by adding
a ± symbol to indicate that an effect of uncertain direction exists. Certainty in direction alone
could be similarly addressed with plus for results near zero but positive and minus for results
near zero but negative.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 48

normalized on the y-axis, indicates the nature of the required relationship
under 0 Emp. The suggestion will be valid when the line denoting the
relationship sits above the line y = 1/2, because 0Empt,' measurements proceed
upward from the horizontal axis and 0,0 measurements proceed
downward from the top of the unit square.
Second, the coding descriptions contain certain ambiguities because
they are not mutually exclusive. For example, suppose a recorded
measurement is overstated because it should actually be zero, which arises
in the reservoir-based recreation row and 0cut (that is, Turbine Bypass)
column. Or suppose a measurement is correctly recorded as zero (perhaps
by the measurement's omission), which arises in the river-based recreation
row of the same column. Should the coding in the first instance be 1, to
focus on the overstatement, or 0, to focus on what the measurement should
have been? Should the coding in the second instance be 2, to focus on a
correct data record, or 0, to focus on what the data record should have
been? Similarly, a recorded positive value for a measurement that should
not be positive may be regarded as an overstatement. The text and Table 2
resolve these ambiguities by coding errors with what should have been and
by coding correctness with what is. When the data record is accurate, a 2
code is assigned; when the data record is inaccurate, the selected code
conveys the nature of an accurate measurement.
Data codes thus rest directly on measurements recorded by
scientists in disciplines other than economics in units of their choice. The
codes ask scientists to closely examine recorded measurements using the
approach of the previous section: What would this measurement be like if
license denial ends hydroelectricity production and this water storage
regime ensues? In other words, how would the recorded measurement of
a good, service, or amenity be regarded under each measurement standard?
Scientists from many disciplines can then combine and summarize their
observations for policy makers. Hence the procedure is inherently
interdisciplinary -it relies on the expertise of both economists and other
scientists -and it generates data useful for analyzing policy and policy
enforcement.
The contribution of economists is likely to be one or both of two
types. As discussed below, the procedure does not accept the absence of a
recorded effect at face value. Properly accounting for the external social
costs of continuing to generate power at an existing hydroelectric project
first requires recognition of foregone opportunities. These are the costs that
power companies may attempt to deny or understate and this text primarily
considers. Alternatively, economists may also be of service in pointing out
attempts to overstate or unnecessarily measure benefits. Other than these
contributions, scientists in other disciplines are presumed to record
quantities according to their own disciplinary judgments. For example,
other scientists may have selected a measurement procedure that was both
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less expensive and less precise than an available alternative. The table and
coding procedure accept this and similar choices at face value.36 In addition,
the data recorded by other scientists are presumed to be correct under some
measurement standard and to be made with certainty, absent some other
source of systematic error.37 The focus is on recording all measurements
indicated by a particular standard and on having all scientists proceed
under the same standard.
Finally, the table has two remaining presumptions. First, it
supposes that there exists exactly one value for the quantity of any good,
service, or amenity that is provided or harmed in one year, although that
value may have been omitted or may be incorrectly recorded when
considered under a particular measurement standard. Second, the table
presumes that measurements used for coding purposes are taken from
documents at a well-defined stage of the relicensing process - perhaps from
an initial license application or FERC environmental analysis, with the
possible exception of missing information. The table also has a notable
drawback: itemizing effects separately largely ignores important
relationships between measured quantities in order to concentrate on the
relationship with the water storage regime. This seems acceptable because
the approach is designed as a tool for evaluating the structure of a
relicensing problem and because a number of relationships will at least be
enumerated or suggested.'
Applying the Model
In principle, all scientists and policy makers involved in relicensing
should consider the same alternative scenario in their decision making,

36. The codes can at least partially be viewed using thinking like "Suppose an amount
of X is worth a dollar." In effect, the table regards the measurements of other scientists as
valuable simply because the scientists decided to record them or not do so. The procedure
then assigns the 2 code when the data record accurately reflects the loss of a beneficial effect
or avoidance of a harmful effect under a particular license denial storage regime. Some other
code appears when the data record is inaccurate.
37. Recall the way in which Table 1 was developed. Each stylized measurement from the
FERC document was initially regarded as correct and then was seen to be correct under a
particular license denial storage regime. The systematic errors did not emerge until the set of
measurements was considered collectively.
38. For example, these relationships might consider reservoir-based recreational
opportunities and dry land recovery opportunities. As previously noted, the article considers
the information that feeds into tradeoff analyses rather than considering the tradeoffs
themselves. Itemizing beneficial and harmful effects separately, however, suggests
possibilities for strategic behavior in relicensing. Interest groups centered around reservoirbased benefits rather naturally oppose groups centered around opportunities foregone by
storing water.
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which means that the baseline for all operating effect measurements should
be the same license denial storage regime no matter which scientific
discipline measures particular effects. A relicensing data set that strictly
relies on one common measurement standard will therefore reveal two
specific characteristics: a column of 2 codes under a single license denial
storage regime along with the absence of omitted rows. Departures from
that result invite investigation, which is what occurs with this stylized set
of FERC data.
The stylized data set derived from the FERC document records
annual electricity production and annual reservoir visits at an existing
hydroelectric project. Also recorded are linear river miles of obstructed fish
passage throughout the filled reservoir site. Assuming each measurement
is correct, the first two accurately record license denial losses and the third
accurately records a license denial gain, when considered under 0 Empty and
presuming no effect from a license denial change in the price of electricity.
Similarly, the FERC document also records a foregone yet recoverable
acreage of dry-land habitat based on a reservoir at 25 percent of its capacity,
which accurately records a license denial gain under 01o. Finally, the FERC
document does not record a measurement for foregone yet recoverable
river-based recreation, which is regarded as the sensible act of not recording
a zero measurement and which is both accurate and appropriate under
0c,rret. Otherwise, the table suggests its potential broader use by providing
a beneficial effect (an avoided air pollutant) not yet discussed in the text
and by using the etcetera designation to suggest consideration of other
hydroelectricity effects with which readers may be familiar.39
Attention first centers on the [2, 1, 0, -1] coding of the reservoirbased recreation and fish passage rows, which are derived by applying the
codes to the corresponding written observations from Table 1, with the 0
codes in the 0 curret column. (Recall that the entire column could contain 0
codes. Continued power production leaves recoverable river-based
recreation essentially unaffected if license denial means merely bypassing
turbines.) These results express the following intuition: continuing to
generate power at an existing hydroelectric facility produces substantial

39. For example, the Colorado River emerges clear and cold from Lake Powell after
electricity is generated at Glen Canyon Dam. It does not do so because turbines filter or
refrigerate but because the reservoir's slack water and thermal properties permit sediment and
colder water to settle. The clarity and temperature effects occur to the extent that the reservoir
produces them; the magnitude and direction of ongoing power generation effects depend on
the extent to which ending electricity generation will change the reservoir. In particular,
trapped sediment at hydroelectric sites may resemble mine tailings, depending on the type
and quantity of waste that settles with the mineral matter. A long-run or empty-reservoir
perspective therefore suggests that the industry's particular method of storing its energyproducing inventory reflects a hidden waste repository rather than cleanliness.

Winter 20081

HYDROELECTRIC RELICENSING

effects in gross terms when 0 Empty applies, as shown by the leftmost 2 codes,
and smaller effects in net terms when continued storage effects are removed
from continued power generation effects, as shown by the 0 codes. This
occurs whether the effects are beneficial or harmful. Continued power
production at this project provides a sizable quantity of recreational
reservoir use and obstructs a sizable quantity of recoverable passage miles
if the specific license denial alternative is to end water storage, namely, to
use the 0 Empty measurement standard. This comports with certain commonly
expressed views about both beneficial and harmful effects of hydroelectricity production. Alternatively, the effects of continued hydroelectricity production are essentially benign if the specific license denial
alternative is to simply bypass turbines, namely, to use the 0 cnt measurement standard. This agrees with other commonly expressed views that
hydroelectricity is a clean and low-cost source of power.
Thus, applying the coding to the data analysis in Table 1 reveals the
likely source of differing views about the external effects of continuing to
operate existing hydroelectric plants: a failure to specify exactly one license
denial storage regime as the measurement standard and the resulting use
of multiple standards. Once in place, this method of power generation
produces little in the way of either positive or negative external effects
compared to the turbine bypass option (which leaves everything in place
other than spinning turbines). By contrast, continued power generation does
noticeably more in both beneficial and harmful terms when compared to the
option of emptying the reservoir. The coding also reveals the foundation for
a fundamental tenet of economic theory - an alternative must be specified
in order to assess tradeoffs because tradeoffs use measurements that also
require specifying an alternative. The external effects of continued
hydroelectric power generation cannot be correctly understood at their most
basic level unless exactly one license denial water-storage regime is
specified before any external effect measurements are adopted for use in
relicensing decisions.
Next, consider that, if license denial means leaving behind an
empty reservoir site, the coding in the dry land habitat row should be [2,1,
0, 0]. From left to right, this essentially indicates a recoverable acreage
under license denial and, thus, an opportunity cost under current
generation practices that diminishes when larger license denial storage
quantities are considered. All acres inundated by a full reservoir are
included under 0Em , fewer acres are included under O,, and zero acres
are recovered under either 0 c.,t or 0 Fu.
Taken together with the [2, 1, 0, -1] coding of the reservoir-based
recreation and obstructed fish passage rows, this coding would indicate that
the dry-land measurement was performed using the same baseline as the
other two measurements because all three coding results would have a 2
code in the leftmost position. Instead, the actual coding for this stylized
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FERC document measurement is [3, 2, 0, 01, as shown in Table 2. In
comparison to the [2, 1, 0, -1] coding of the reservoir-based recreation and
obstructed fish passage rows, visitor-days of reservoir-based recreation and
river miles of obstructed fish passage have been correctly recorded under
0
Emptyl while acres of foregone dry-land recovery have not. Rather, acres of
foregone dry-land habitat have been correctly recorded under 0ow and
understated under 0Epty. Some acreage of interest to terrestrial biologists
and others has not been included under 0 Empy because a different standard
of measurement was apparently used.' This error occurs before any
economic effort to measure the value of recovery on those acres in dollar
terms and before any similar effort to provide tradeoff information relative
to other effects like reservoir-based recreation.
This type of error understates a legitimate social cost when using
0
Erpty and is therefore a source of subsidized hydroelectric power generation. In controlled experiment terms, suppose that both a beneficial effect
and a harmful effect increase with treatment and results are reported only
for the higher of two treatment levels. This error type permits beneficial
effect reporting relative to the absence of treatment and harmful effect
reporting relative to the low treatment level; the error fundamentally
misstates the harmful effect measurement relative to the beneficial effect
measurement. A pattern of similar measurement problems indicates bias in
the experimental design or data treatments used to inform a relicensing
decision and to prompt consideration of harmful effect mitigation measures.
It then becomes difficult to imagine an equal consideration result emerging
from the remainder of a relicensing process.
The remaining measurement from the FERC document concerns
foregone yet recoverable river-based recreation. If license denial means
leaving behind an empty reservoir site, the coding in this row should be [2,
1, 0, -1], which exactly matches the existing rows for reservoir-based
recreation and obstructed fish passage. Briefly, a degraded form of riverbased recreation can occur throughout the entire reservoir site length if the
measurement proceeds under 0 EmPr , as shown by the 2 code, and river40. Caution is needed in reaching the conclusion that a different standard of
measurement has actually been used. The discussion omits indirect electricity price effects,
which may coincidentally produce a systematic quantity error that precisely mimics the
systematic error resulting from use of a different measurement standard. This seems unlikely
for any single understated harmful effect and less likely still for all understated harmful
effects; the article primarily addresses a pattern of understatement potentially discoverable
in a collation of the latter. This qualification therefore emphasizes the potential usefulness of
economic analysis in the relicensing problem as well as the potential usefulness of considering
multiple measurement standards. An understatement under 0 m suggests the use of a
different measurement standard when paired with a correct value under a different
measurement standard. The absence of an alternative understatement explanation, such as
systematic error mimicry, verifies the use of a different measurement standard.
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based recreation will be unaffected by license denial under 0c. , as shown
by the 0 code. Instead, the actual coding for this stylized FERC document
measurement is [3, 3, 2, -1]. The existing data record understates
recoverable river-based recreation if license denial means leaving behind an
empty reservoir site, as shown by the leftmost 3 code, and instead records
a zero value (by omission) that is correct if license denial means bypassing
turbines, as shown by the 2 code.
This error indicates that power generation is subsidized due to a
complete failure to acknowledge a legitimate social cost, namely the riverbased recreational use that is recoverable if license denial means ending
water storage and is thus given up by continuing current power generation
practices. In controlled experiment terms, the failure excludes a known
harmful effect from the experiment's set of measurements, while the known
beneficial effect of provided reservoir-based recreation is included.
Complete failures like this prevent economists, other scientists, and policy
makers from recognizing and considering certain social costs of continued
hydroelectric power generation before they can be measured, before
tradeoffs regarding other external effects can be addressed, and before
electricity reaches consumers at some price. A pattern of similar omissions
or missing entries is an indication of bias in the experimental design itself.
This also makes it difficult to imagine an equal consideration result
emerging from the remainder of a relicensing process.
Other potential coding results, which are suggested rather than
provided in Table 2, offer other insights. The equilibrium power quantity
will fall if hydroelectric power were replaced with power from a more
costly source that results in a higher price. This means that an existing
power production measurement overstates the expected electricity quantity
under license denial. Prospective license denial then indicates a [1, 1, 1, 11
coding. Similarly, the coding would be [2, 2, 2, 2] if no price change is
predicted and [3, 3, 3, 3] if a falling price is indicated. The codes remain
constant across the different measurement standards because consumers are
presumed to be indifferent about the source of electricity, so electricity use
is not related to water storage practices. Measurements of an avoided air
pollutant can be included if thermal generation is the replacement
considered for hydroelectric generation. The procedure again reveals that
knowing a specific alternative is a prerequisite to proper measurement in
the relicensing problem - knowing whether or not to include measurements
of an avoided air pollutant depends on specifying an alternative source of
electricity. If indicated, this coding result would presumably be [2, 2, 2, 2].
Coding in the power quantity row addresses the electricity price response,
if any, and the coding recognizes recorded measurements for the avoided
pollutant as being correct. The presumption rests on the lack of any
substantial relationship between air pollution measurements and water
storage practices. Similar results would be expected for other beneficial and
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harmful effects that are not related to water storage practices, so that no
confounding difficulties arise from this source. Of course, this does not
eliminate the possibility of important confounding effects from other
sources, which this article does not examine.
No single license denial storage regime contains correct measurements for all effects examined in this stylized data set because correctness
would appear as a column of 2 codes under that license denial storage
regime. This fact is inconsistent with a scientific process that uniformly
assumes a single license denial storage regime when measuring the effects
of continued project operations. Both the river-based recreation and dryland habitat measurements are understated if license denial means ending
water storage, as shown by their 3 codes in the 0 Empty column, and are
correctly measured under different license denial storage regimes, as shown
by the differing column locations of their respective 2 codes. These 3 codes
in that column indicate that, if license denial means leaving behind an
empty reservoir site, foregone opportunities are being understated. Thus,
the harmful effects of continued project operations are greater than those
measured in the FERC document, potential mitigation measures for these
harmful effects are unlikely to be properly and fully considered, and the
weight of evidence supporting license denial is larger than admitted.
Indeed, the coding can reveal in sensible but crude terms either a
balance or net view of whether relicensing should be favored under a
particular circumstance. Suppose that all beneficial and harmful effects are
correctly included and are measured under a single standard, which will
yield a complete column of 2 codes. Then suppose that hydroelectric power
generation and its external beneficial effects are considered jointly as social
goods, that external harmful effects are considered collectively as social
harms, that social goods and social harms are equal in number, and that all
are equally valued at the margin. If so, replacing hydroelectric generation
with electricity from a more costly alternative that has no external benefits
of its own shifts the balance from indifference to harm and the net from zero
to negative. There would be precisely as many beneficial 2 codes as harmful
2 codes if current practice continues, but for coding power generation with
a 1 code to reflect the more costly replacement source and expected higher
electricity price. This potential shift indicates that approval of a new license
should be favored over denial.
This section has presented a procedure and coding mechanism that
economists and other scientists can use to examine the experimental design
and data treatments that inform hydroelectric relicensing decisions. The
procedure's tabular structure is that of a relicensing problem with positive
and negative externalities in the electricity market. This coding example,
which used stylized data derived from an actual FERC environmental
analysis, considered correct identification and measurement of external
effects due to continued hydroelectric power generation at an existing
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facility where reservoir-based recreation and a complete fish passage
obstruction exist. The example showed the presence of systematic measurement errors no matter what license denial storage regime was considered.
It also showed the clear understatement or outright omission of harmful
effects, namely effects that suggest or indicate mitigation measures and
weigh against a new operating license if the specific license denial
alternative is emptying the reservoir. The only beneficial effect examined,
which supports a new operating license, was fully and correctly measured
under this same license denial alternative. This article now concludes with
reflections on the experimental design and policy implications derived from
the procedure.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The analysis of hydroelectric relicensing in this article relies on
economic, scientific, and legal principles. Economically, power companies
have an incentive to use the relicensing process as an opportunity to pursue
subsidized power generation. Scientifically, proper measurement requires
that a single measurement standard be used for all relicensing measurements along with their interpretations and uses, and it requires that measurements indicated under that standard be rigorously pursued. This
ensures that all scientists address their respective aspects of the same
experiment, that confounding is avoided or properly addressed, and that
indicated measurements are not omitted. Legally, equal consideration of
power and non-power values is mandated. The success of power companies
in achieving their economic goals conflicts with the achievement of the
scientific and legal requirements of relicensing.
From a different perspective, this analysis rests on the mathematical
observation that finite, nonzero number-line representations of quantitative
relicensing measurements have two endpoints. It also rests on the statistical
observation that these endpoints represent the end of power generation via
license denial and the continuation of current power generation practices.
The measurements thus obtained can be sorted into beneficial and harmful
effects, where the former support a new license and the latter support
license denial. These are the data values relevant for the simplest relicensing
question -do measurements support a renewed license, yes or no? Any
operational changes, mitigation measures, or associated tradeoff analyses
that may subsequently be considered rest on this foundation.
This article examined a small set of familiar, yet stylized, measurements from a FERC environmental analysis prepared for a project in the
western United States at some point in the past several years and kept these
measurements in the quantity form directly obtained by scientists who are
not economists. It also set aside all notions of relative value that economists
would customarily employ, namely prices, which are intratemporal, and
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discount rates, which are intertemporal. This approach revealed the
presence of systematic measurement errors in the FERC document, which
were presented in a written form (Table 1) and a coded numerical form
(Table 2). These errors occurred because certain recorded measurements
were correct under certain license denial water storage regimes, which were
referred to as operating effect baselines or measurement standards, but
were incorrect under other regimes. There was no single license denial
regime under which all measurements were correct, however, and
systematic errors were present regardless of the license denial storage
regime considered. The empirical example was narrow in scope and the
derived data were limited, although it is reasonable to expect that such
familiar measurements will be recorded without systematic error. Also, not
all license denial storage regimes were considered; however, the analysis
only omitted a varying license denial reservoir level with water storage and
release attributes that differ from existing generation practices in ways other
than bypassing turbines.
Several additional observations also emerged from this analysis.
First, measurement policy in hydroelectric relicensing requires specification
of a single license denial water storage regime. The issue of dam removal,
either partial or complete, is distinctly secondary because dams can stand
without water being stored. A dam removal policy implies zero storage if
a license is denied, which corresponds to the article's 0Empty measurement
standard. However, if the plan does not include dam removal, then the
measurement standard needs to specify exactly one license denial storage
regime lest the policy lack precision and provide inadequate scientific
direction.
Second, a policy of zero storage in the event of license denial is
defensible as the measurement baseline. The data set's correct measurements under this standard agreed with views that continued hydroelectric
generation provides sizable benefits and imposes sizable harm. Furthermore, this standard is a natural (though not the only) scientific alternative.
None of the other examined standards provided both broad agreement and
an intuitive scientific rationale. Indeed, it may be difficult to imagine a
justification for other license denial storage regimes. For example, how
would one justify a nationwide measurement policy that beneficial and
harmful operating effects of existing hydroelectric plants will be based on
presuming that license denial means holding reservoirs at 25 percent of
their capacity?
Third, the general public may well misunderstand the problem and
therefore use or fail to discern multiple measurement standards for two
particular reasons. One is that measurements that are useful for evaluating
new projects differ from measurements that are useful for evaluating
existing projects. The former consider the potential onset of hydroelectricity
production relative to its absence and the latter consider the continuation
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of existing hydroelectric production practices relative to ending power
production. Thus, constructing a new project may provide 100,000 annual
visitor-days of reservoir-based recreation. Yet, if license denial means
merely bypassing turbines, then none of these visits are actually at stake in
the relicensing process. Therefore, none of these visits should be regarded
as relevant effects of continuing to operate an existing hydroelectric plant.
This conclusion relates to the second source of public misunderstanding, namely that the license denial water storage regime simultaneously determines the effects of license denial and the effects of continued
operations. The legislative intent behind the equal consideration language
may ultimately be the best guide to a social consensus and legal conclusion
regarding the applicable license denial storage regime: Congress may have
viewed the next-best alternative use of existing hydroelectric sites as freely
flowing rivers, which indicates use of the OEmpy standard for measurement
purposes. However, it is difficult to imagine that Congress intended a
process with systematic error where the generous OEmpl standard provides
large measurements for beneficial effects of hydroelectric production by
including water storage effects and other more restrictive standards reduce
harmful effect measurements by partially or fully excluding water storage
effects and producing understatements.
In addition, a practical observation about the observed systematic
errors is that their presence increases the difficulty of conducting the
relicensing process. Suppose, for example, that license denial means ending
water storage and that river-based recreation is valuable. If so, continued
power production maintains the scarcity of this type of recreation. In turn,
this will motivate strong mitigation arguments such as suggestions that
substitute opportunities be provided or improved elsewhere because value
is positively related to scarcity. On the other hand, continued power
production at an existing reservoir site imposes the opportunity cost of
foregone yet recoverable river-based recreation when license denial means
the end of water storage. With a nonzero quantity involved and other
explanations for FERC's omission of this recreation type discarded,4 what
remains is an agency that has regarded river-based recreation as valueless.
Just as a potential buyer cannot reach agreement with a potential seller
when the buyer's maximum acceptable price is less than the seller's
minimum acceptable price, those who correctly perceive power-imposed
river scarcity and high relative value at an existing reservoir site will find
it difficult or impossible to reach mitigation agreements with an agency
that, through systematic measurement error, understates or does not
acknowledge either the scarcity or value of river attributes.

41.

See supra note 19.
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At the extremes, the storage regimes under license denial are an
empty reservoir site or a full one, so remaining observations focus on these
two cases. If the alternative to continued hydroelectric power generation is
a full reservoir, then these particular measurements are scientifically
indicated for both beneficial and harmful effects. Departures from this
standard can occur by either including unnecessary beneficial effect
measurements or using overstated measurements, while harmful effects
may be omitted or understated. This suggests a twofold focus for parties
interested in relicensing - finding overstated or unnecessary beneficial
effect measurements and finding understated or omitted harmful effect
measurements. The first of these is accomplished by explicitly netting out
reservoir effects, even to the degree that nominally beneficial effects become
negative and weigh against a new operating license. Doing so deliberately
avoids consideration of zero storage. When combined with the second
focus, finding harmful effect measurements that understate or omit social
costs, error correction would increase the marginal social cost and decrease
the marginal social benefit of continuing to operate particular projects. The
equilibrium electricity quantity would fall but the effects on price and
consumer surplus would not be known without appropriate data. In
particular, this type of error retains reservoir fluctuation practices at more
reservoirs than is socially optimal.
If the alternative to continued hydroelectric production is an empty
reservoir site, these particular measurements are scientifically indicated for
both beneficial and harmful effects. Departures from this standard can
occur by either omitting or understating harmful effect measurements,
while beneficial effect measurements are likely to be fully and correctly
measured. Power companies are unlikely to forego relicensing opportunities that permit them to remind FERC of the beneficial effects to be lost
upon license denial. This suggests a singular focus on finding understated
or omitted harmful effect measurements, which can be accomplished by
explicitly considering zero water storage throughout the relicensing
process. Otherwise understated or omitted harmful effect measurements
understate the social cost of continued hydroelectric generation. The
subsidy retains more reservoir sites with nonzero storage than is socially
optimal, and correcting the subsidy would decrease equilibrium electricity
consumption, increase the price, and lower consumer surplus.'

42. The discussion has concentrated on the environmental components of the equal
consideration clause; the concluding paragraphs now address the energy conservation
component of that clause. Subsidies promote greater energy use, so the equal consideration
clause can be used to argue that the relicensing process is specifically intended to remove
existing hydroelectric subsidies, if any, and forbid the development of new subsidies,
whatever their source.
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Whatever license denial storage regime is used as the measurement
standard that informs relicensing decisions, its enforcement is likely to be
difficult. First, multiple measurement standards or a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem may well exist in the general public. Second,
if the project analyzed in this article is representative of FERC's analytical
methods and thus indicates that the agency tends to base relicensing
decisions on inaccurate environmental information, consumer surplus
either may or will fall by eliminating systematic measurement error. Third,
using the Empty Reservoir baseline is likely to raise the controversial topic
of possibly breaching existing dams. Using some other baseline may reveal
that a variety of sources routinely and perhaps dramatically overstate the
beneficial effects of continued generation at existing hydroelectric projects.
Alternatively, these sources may be citing information that is irrelevant
because it dates to project construction and cannot be influenced by the
relicensing process. Fourth, the broad variety of environmental effects
provides multiple systematic error opportunities.
Finally, the results of this analysis are valuable to the economics
literature, may help forge a stronger relationship between economics and
other sciences, and offer guidance to parties interested in relicensing. First,
the results reinforce the need for economists to precisely understand the set
of production possibilities as research evolves in this policy arena. Indeed,
it may be that language stronger than valuing ecosystem services at zero is
warranted: all or some of these values are written off when either omission
or bias understates foregone opportunities, which are unknown until a
single license denial storage regime is specified. For the zero storage option
in particular, much of the environmental damage from continued generation may occur in two rather hidden ways. One is delayed recovery
opportunities, which in turn may reduce recovery rates and either reduce
or eliminate recovery probabilities, and the other is the retention and
eventual exposure of sediment that may hold concentrated contaminants.
In addition, the approach may help economists convey the idea that the
relicensing problem is a scientific exercise that corresponds precisely to
standard textbook descriptions of the discipline. The structural form of an
economics problem, which involves balancing and tradeoff considerations
called for in potentially allocating scarce resources to continued hydroelectricity generation at existing projects, was unavoidably retained when
relative value notions were set aside.
Second, the analogy to controlled experiments may provide other
scientists a useful window into the economist's differently structured
problem-solving world of different weights and measures that still examines
the same experiment. By omitting relative value observations, scientists in
other disciplines can focus on their own measurements and perhaps realize
a need for price or similar value information. Using this article's codes for
balancing and optimization purposes only permits the inherent tradeoffs of
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potential operating changes or mitigation measures to be evaluated in terms
of, for example, three beneficial effects given up for two harmful effects
eliminated. Using quantity information alone permits greater precision,
such as trading 500 foregone annual megawatt-hours for an increase of
1,000 annual reservoir visitor-days by limiting reservoir fluctuations, but is
unlikely to be accurate because it seeks balance and optimization through
barter. The approach uniformly avoids obtainable data about the value that
society actually places on these small changes, when economists can
provide or draw valid conclusions from at least some of that data with
reasonable accuracy and precision.
Finally, this article may suggest reallocations of scarce resources
among parties interested in relicensing. If zero storage is not the measurement baseline, then concerns about achieving zero storage when license
denial ends electricity generation at existing hydroelectric facilities are not
relevant. If zero storage is the measurement baseline, then more data
supporting that potential outcome may be gathered by explicitly using that
baseline and the matter of achieving zero storage when licenses are denied
at marginal projects will reduce to a simpler question of how to do so
cheaply.
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